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An Antitrust Allegory
by
JOHN J. FLYNN*
John Sherman Widget Co.
V.
Adam Smith Widgets, inc.,
- U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1410 (1990).
Justice SPENCER delivered the opin-
ion of the Court.
This is a treble damage action
under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
et seq., the only antitrust case of any
kind filed in the federal courts in the
past two years.1 We take note of the
fact that the Attorney General an-
nounced a year ago that ninety-five
percent of the personnel in the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of
Justice had been transferred to other
duties in the Department following the
successful completion of its criminal
prosecutions against the only remain-
ing road builders not then in jail for
price-fixing. A "skeleton crew" staffs
the Division to monitor labor union
*Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law, Col-
lege of Law, University of Utah. Concern
for the well-being and reputation of several
good friends who read and commented on
drafts of this allegory requires the omission
of their names from this, the normal place
for printing such information. For names,
send a self-addressed stamped envelope.
1. The Justice Department did file two civil
antitrust cases back in 1987, but the econ-
omy has obviously been functioning effi-
ciently since then, requiring no new litiga-
tion to force it to do so.
2. The defendants are in reality a single de-
fendant since the Consortium has incorpo-
activities, the most likely area for con-
tinuing antitrust concern. Since the
Federal Trade Commission has closed
all of its offices save those of the Com-
missioners, no reliable statistics are
available with regard to its activities, if
any, in enforcing the antitrust laws.
Although the few staff members re-
maining at the Commission continue
to issue occasional studies, demon-
strating how a policy of laissez-faire
promotes the most efficient use of re-
sources (hereinafter "the neoclassical
economic model" or "The Model"), it
is apparent that neither the staff nor
the members of the Commission have
any intention of filing any new
antitrust or unfair competition
proceedings.
The plaintiff, John Sherman Wid-
get Co., ,alleged that the defendants, a
consortium of widget manufacturers
and distributors, 2 have engaged in a
wide variety of antitrust violations in-
rated itself under Delaware Law as the
Widget Manufacturers Cartel & Consor-
tium, Inc. The plaintiff, however, sued the
Consortium and each of its members indi-
vidually. In the court below the defend-
ants raised the issue of whether they could
be sued individually, that is, whether the
plaintiff was required to sue only the entity
they created to carry out their agreement.
The trial court did not consider it neces-
sary to decide this issue, although the court
did observe that under Copperveld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 474 U.S. 752,
104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984),
there was "much merit to the defendants'
[5171
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cluding a horizontal conspiracy at the
manufacturing level to fix the price of
widgets, a conspiracy to monopolize
the widget manufacturing business,
and a conspiracy to engage in preda-
tory pricing in the distribution of wid-
gets by charging high prices in geo-
graphic markets where they had no
competition and "below cost" prices
in those markets where the plaintiff
sold widgets. Plaintiff also complained
that each of the defendant manufac-
turers had imposed exclusive dealing
contracts and geographical and cus-
tomer restrictions on their distributors
so as to prevent competition between
those distributors and prevent compet-
ing suppliers from reaching them. The
plaintiff also alleged that several of the
defendants had entered into resale
price maintenance agreements with
their distributors and had actively po-
liced the distributors to insure that
they observed the prices established by
each of the manufacturers.
Widgets are a fungible product
with a wide variety of home and man-
ufacturing applications. They are
made in standard sizes by at least fif-
teen domestic manufacturers, fourteen
of which belong to the defendant
Widget Consortium of America. The
Smith Company is the dominant man-
ufacturer and distributor, with over
50% of the market. The plaintiff,
argument." Since the lower court did not
decide the issue and the parties have not
argued it before this Court, we do not de-
cide it. We note, however, that it is not a
frivolous contention. A corporation is a
single person and as such it cannot con-
spire with itself. Furthermore, Copperweld
instructs us to look at form, not substance,
in deciding who or what may be considered
persons for purposes of contract and con-
spiracy doctrine under the Sherman Act.
Ever since Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 6 S.Ct. 1132, 30
L.Ed. 118 (1886), we have held that a cor-
Sherman Company, is a relative new-
comer to the market, having been es-
tablished in 1980. Since that time, it
has gained a 5% market share by ag-
gressive marketing through discount
outlets and mail-order catalogues.
The Sherman Company has refused to
join the Consortium despite the en-
treaties of the Consortium. Although
there are several foreign manufactur-
ers of widgets, imports have been neg-
ligible. The record indicates that it is
relatively inexpensive to manufacture
widgets and that the light weight and
small size of widgets make national
marketing from a central manufactur-
ing facility the normal pattern.
On defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court granted
defendants a directed verdict at the
end of the plaintiff's case. The court
did so after several evidentiary rulings
excluding evidence offered by the
plaintiff. The court ruled that tape re-
cordings and minutes of the meetings
of the defendant members of the Con-
sortium were inadmissible. Those
tapes and minutes indicated the de-
fendants agreed on prices and directed
certain Consortium members to cut
prices in markets where the plaintiff
was selling widgets in order to "drive
that non-conformist Sherman out of
business." The trial court also ex-
cluded two documents that plaintiff
poration is a person for constitutional and
other purposes. Just as a rose is a rose by
whatever name, a person is a person by
whatever name. And, since it takes two or
more persons to conspire or have a "meet-
ing of the minds" for the purpose of a con-
tract, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the Consortium cannot contract or
conspire with itself. Q.E.D. In any event,
because of our decision on the merits in
this case, we do not think the issue is likely
to be a troublesome one in the future and
therefore decline to reach it.
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claimed conclusively proved a conspir-
acy in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. One document, a fifty
page contract among the members of
the Consortium, specifies in great de-
tail the prices, customers, and markets
allocated to each member. It is signed
and notarized, and bears the corporate
seal of each member of the
Consortium.
The second document is an agree-
ment between the Consortium, the
Asian Widget Manufacturers Associa-
tion, and the European Cartel of Wid-
get Manufacturers dividing the world
market and binding its signatories to
abide by the terms of the agreement.
This document is witnessed by the As-
sistant Attorney General for Antitrust
and the Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission. The witnesses at-
tached a joint statement to the docu-
ment asserting that "efficiency de-
mands that rational businessmen be
permitted to implement freely their
judgments, either by contract or
through a partial integration of their
functions, as to how best to set prices
3. Citing R. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law § 1.1 (3d ed. 1986). The document
quoted the following statement from Pos-
ner: "The reader who understands the
three fundamental concepts ... the inverse
relationship between price and output, al-
ternative and opportunity cost, and the
tendency of resources to gravitate from
lower valued to higher valued uses if vol-
untary exchange is permitted-is prepared
to deal with a surprising variety of eco-
nomic questions." According to the state-
ment, among the economic questions an-
swered by The Model is that rational
maximizers know their self-interest best
and should be allowed freely to express it
through voluntary agreements. In this way
"efficiency" will be realized through the
exploitation of resources in such a way that
value-human satisfaction as measured by
aggregate human willingness to pay for
goods and services-is maximized. Any
government intervention in this process is,
and allocate resources." The state-
ment went on to claim that both pro-
ducers and consumers are rational
maximizers of their own self-interest,
that there is an inverse relationship be-
tween prices charged and quantity de-
manded, that sellers seek to maximize
the difference between their costs and
their sales revenues, and that scarce
resources gravitate to their highest val-
ued uses if free exchange is permitted.3
Based on these assumptions, the
statement suggested that permitting
the parties to the Consortium to en-
gage in a rational act (maximizing
their profits) would ultimately maxi-
mize the efficient use of society's re-
sources as rational consumers re-
sponded to rational suppliers and the
market process sorted out the optimal
solution.4 They added that "the rights
of property and freedom of contract,
sacred and inalienable rights in our
system of capitalism, require that the
Consortium be allowed to enter into
and have the government enforce this
agreement." 5
The trial court was called upon at
of course, logically counter-productive and
necessarily generates inefficiency.
4. It is shocking to realize that just four
short years ago a United States District
Court rejected such a logical wealth-maxi-
mizing argument asserted by Coca-Cola in
its attempt to acquire Dr. Pepper. See
FTC v. The Coca-Cola Co., 1986-2 Trade
Cases Para. 67,208 (D.D.C. 1986).
5. It is interesting to note that this agree-
ment has been the subject of constant criti-
cism before the United Nations at the in-
stance of the Soviet Union, the only major
widget manufacturing country which has
refused to join an international cartel.
Three Soviet manufacturers of widgets
openly compete on price with each other
and with the defendants in world markets.
But this irrational behavior is nothing new
for the Soviet Union. Back in 1976 our
Federal Maritime Commission had to force
them to join our shipping cartels in the
March 1987]
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the summary judgment stage to deter-
mine whether a material issue of fact
existed. An issue of fact, the court
quite rightly noted, exists only about
propositions or events that are plausi-
ble or possible. Allegations that water
ran uphill or that a man flew to the
moon and back without mechanical
assistance do not present issues of fact.
Accordingly, the trial court reasoned
that it must measure the allegations in
plaintiff's complaint and the evidence
offered in their support against the as-
sumptions of The Model.
That Model or law, which inexo-
rably governs us all and for which we
are deeply grateful, states universal
truths about the behavior of rational
suppliers and consumers, and particu-
larly declares that all persons will at
all times and under all circumstances
attempt to maximize their own bene-
fits. Plaintiff's allegations regarding
the meetings between the defendants
and among the Consortia are obvi-
ously inconsistent with the law of per-
fect competition 6 which exists at all
times and in all places, and with the
assumption of single-minded price
competition among firms in order to
maximize profits. Thus, the trial court
found that the meetings could not
have happened and, therefore, did not
happen.
North Atlantic. See "Soviet is Moving to
End Slashing of Ocean Rates," New York
Times, Oct. 26, 1976, p. 1, col. 5.
6. "Perfect competition" has been described
as follows:
"Perfect" competition . . . means
an absolutely "frictionless" world.
Everybody knows everything, eve-
ryone can be everywhere at once,
coal heavers can become brain sur-
geons, and brain surgeons can be-
come coal heavers, overnight. The
capital embodied in a university can
transform itself overnight into a
battleship and so on.
The court also excluded the writ-
ten documents relating to the interna-
tional meeting of widget manufactur-
ers. The Model indicates it would be
counter-productive and impossible for
all the world's widget manufacturers
to engage in the conduct alleged with
any hope of success. In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on the as-
sumption that any deviation from the
model of perfect competition would
invite cheating by participants in the
cartel, driven by the inexorable force
of profit maximization, or that it
would result in entry into the business
by non-widget manufacturers in quest
of the monopoly profits of the cartel. 7
Since The Model assumes the rational-
ity of all members of the Consortium,
written documents suggesting a con-
trary method of operation must refer
to events that did not take place.
Only two possible conclusions follow.
One is that the documents themselves
do not exist, and the other is that if the
documents exist, they are false. The
trial court concluded that it could not
consider either non-existent or false
documents to support the existence of
a material issue of fact and that, there-
fore, the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment must be granted.
In the alternative, the court ruled
that even if the meetings did occur, the
Wright, Some Pitfalls of Economic Theory
as a Guide to the Law of Competition, 37
Va.L.Rev. 1083, 1085-86 (1951).
7. The court cited Easterbrook, The Limits
of Antitrust, 63 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1984).
The trial court's reading of Easterbrook is
an accurate exposition of the consequences
of following his assumptions. The "limits"
of antitrust as a device for regulating im-
perfections in the market, in Easterbrook's
view, are somewhere between minimal and
zero, with all doubts to be resolved in favor
of zero.
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matters that the tapes and minutes in-
dicated were topics of discussion 8
could not be made the basis of a
Sherman Act claim because they could
not have caused the type of injury to
the plaintiff the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent. The court found
that if the defendants did engage in the
activity alleged, they would have con-
ferred a benefit on the plaintiff rather
than harmed it. According to The
Model, the defendants would have
been selling above marginal cost which
would have allowed the plaintiff to un-
dercut them in the marketplace, as-
suming the plaintiff was operating effi-
ciently. If the defendants were cutting
prices below marginal cost to drive the
plaintiff out of the market, that con-
duct would confer the benefit of lower
prices on consumers-the sole in-
tended beneficiary of the antitrust
laws. Since the plaintiff was a compet-
itor and not a consumer, the court
held the plaintiff lacked standing to
8. Among the topics of discussion the tapes
and minutes recorded are: prices, "de-
stroying the Sherman" firm, "wiping Sher-
man off the face of the Earth," "getting our
returns back up to a decent 60% rate,"
"keeping distributors in line on customers,
territories, and prices," cutting off "distrib-
utors who deal with that non-conformist
Sherman and cut prices," price schedules,
subsidizing those members of the Consor-
tium who had to cut prices in Sherman's
areas of operation, etc.
9. This is so because The Model would be
unmanageable if too many variables were
included in the analysis or if the variables
were permitted to be dynamic and chang-
ing. Professor Leff's reformulation of the
problem of the second-best sums up the
difficulty: "If a state of affairs is the prod-
uct of n variables, and you have knowledge
of, or control over, less than n variables, if
you think you know what's going to hap-
pen when you 'vary' your variables, you're
a booby." Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
Va.L.Rev. 451, 476 (1974). "Boobiness" is
maintain a suit in these circumstances.
Because reality can be viewed only in
snapshots lest The Model itself be de-
stroyed,9 the court stated that any sub-
sequent raising of prices after the
plaintiff was driven from the market
could be appraised only at the time it
took place and only at the instance of
a consumer claiming to be injured by
reason of a conspiracy to raise
prices. 10 The court concluded with
the further observation that the plain-
tiff would lack standing to sue in any
event because it would be impossible
to prove that any of the alleged con-
duct was the proximate cause of any
measurable antitrust injury to it.
I
We think it important to set forth
the trial court's skillful analysis of the
law leading it to its conclusions. Cit-
ing Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 474 U.S. ,
106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986), 11 the trial court
avoided by confining the analysis to a fixed
set of quantifiable variables measured by
snapshots of the static world placed under
the analytical microscope, thereby avoid-
ing destruction of The Model for analysis.
10. Such a claim would, of course, be sub-ject to the indirect-purchaser standing de-
cisions of this Court and the policy of let-
ting the market correct the problem itself
through cheating by members of the Con-
sortium and the inevitable new entry that
prices above marginal cost would attract.
We would also expect any suit by a cheater
disciplined by the other parties to the
agreement, or a suit by a new entrant
claiming the Consortium engaged in strate-
gic behavior designed to raise entry barri-
ers or exclude it, to be resolved by the
well-established maxim that the antitrust
laws are designed to protect competition,
not competitors.
11. In that case, evidence tendered by the
plaintiffs allegedly showed that Japan's
consumer electronics manufacturers, their
export trading companies, and their United
March 1987]
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noted that this Court has instructed
that motions for summary judgment in
antitrust cases are to be judged by the
predictions of the neoclassical eco-
nomic model, not the facts. The court
reasoned that Matsushita requires the
respondent to a motion for summary
judgment in an antitrust case to show
that the predictions of The Model do
not follow from the assumptions of
The Model.1 2 The trial court pointed
out that economic theory instructs us
States distributors had formed a cartel
designed to raise prices for their products
in Japan's protected domestic market to
support lower fixed prices in the United
States market. The same model television
set manufactured in Japan was sold in the
United States at up to 50% below the price
charged for it in the Japan market. The
agreement to price high in Japan and low
in the United States was allegedly reached
through and administered by the Televi-
sion Export Council, a cartel of all of Ja-
pan's major consumer electronics manu-
facturers. Plaintiff alleged that the
Japanese government encouraged the for-
mation of the cartel and orchestrated its
export activities. The agreement also di-
vided customers and limited each manufac-
turer to distributing through five United
States distributors. Over the fifteen plus
years of its operation, Japan's manufactur-
ers increased their U.S. market share from
5% to 50%. The plaintiffs' theory and ex-
pert witness testimony claimed all this took
place by pricing well below United States
manufacturers in the United States market
while fencing United States manufacturers
out of Japan's market where the cartel
maintained high fixed prices.
We ignored this and additional evidence
of a coordinated effort to price below cost
and support low prices in the United States
with high prices in the protected Japan
market because The Model dictated that
such conduct could not happen. 106 S.Ct.,
at 1359. We stated that no rational busi-
nessman, driven by the single-minded pur-
suit of profit, would conspire with competi-
tors for twenty years to monopolize the
United States market by predatory and be-
low-cost pricing without hope of recouping
the lost profits plus interest. In the course
of our opinion, we ignored attempts to
vary the number of variables to be ac-
counted for by The Model for decision, see
n. 9, supra, such as evidence that the de-
fendants were motivated by a need for
growth and market share rather than
profit, that they had a need to dump their
products because of excess capacity attrib-
utable to policies of the Japanese govern-
ment earmarking the industry for growth
and export, and expert witness testimony
indicating that the defendants were not op-
erating pursuant to the assumptions of The
Model. As is obvious, we held that for
purposes of a motion for summary judg-
ment in an antitrust case, a court is to de-
termine whether the complaint states a
claim by measuring it against the assump-
tions and predictions of The Model, rather
than against the evidence produced by the
parties. The Third Circuit finally got the
message on remand of the case. See In re
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Liti-
gation, 807 F.2d 44 (CA3 1986) (dis-
missing both the antitrust and Antidump-
ing Act claims; plaintiffs are foreclosed
from arguing the predictions of The Model
do not follow from the assumptions of The
Model regardless of the facts in the record
of the case).
While some may think statutes like the
antitrust laws are intended to control irra-
tional conduct, Matsushita establishes that
the assumptions of The Model (all markets
are perfectly competitive and driven by ra-
tional profit maximizers) determine what
facts can sensibly be believed and that The
Model dictates the goals the antitrust laws
seek to achieve (to maximize consumer
welfare). It would, therefore, be irrational
to assume that competitors would behave
in ways contrary to the behavior of rational
maximizers; it would also-of course-
bring chaos to the analysis to permit the
antitrust laws to serve goals other than the
maximization of "consumer welfare"-
whatever that means.
12. The Matsushita opinion requires the
non-moving party to come forward with
"specific facts showing that there is a genu-
ine issue for trial." 106 S.Ct., at 1356. If
the claim is one "that simply makes no
economic sense," according to The Model,
the party moved against "must come for-
ward with more persuasive evidence to
support their claim than would otherwise
be necessary." Ibid. The balance of the
opinion is devoted to showing how none of
the explanations by the party moved
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that efforts to cartelize a market are
fruitless because "rational maximiz-
ers" know they can never in that way
achieve success on a long-term basis
nor recoup the losses incurred in cut-
ting prices to drive out a competitor.13
We agree. Losses are certain to
arise because The Model assumes that
competitors cannot fence out new en-
trants or discipline effectively mem-
bers of the cartel who cheat. The pro-
against demonstrate that the predictions of
The Model do not follow from the assump-
tions of The Model. Attempts to demon-
strate that the assumptions of The Model
did not equate with the facts of the dispute
were either ignored or found to be based on
speculative or inadmissible testimony.
Some of the evidence plaintiff relied upon
was found irrelevant and speculative be-
cause the assumptions and predictions of
The Model made the evidence not plausi-
ble. The evidence that was ignored was ev-
idence suggesting the assumptions of The
Model were not operative in the circum-
stances in dispute. We think the Court's
approach in that case is mandated by the
logic of The Model which has, of course,
become the logic of the legal process in
these kinds of cases. See n. 19, infra.
As for any claim that The Model is
based on unrealistic assumptions, we need
not concern ourselves with such a non-sci-
entific approach. In the science of econom-
ics, reality is compared with the predic-
tions of The Model-not the assumptions
underlying The Model. See M. Friedman,
The Methodology of Positive Economics,
in Essays in Positive Economics 3 (M.
Friedman ed. 1953). This view of eco-
nomic models has frequently been termed
the "Ouija Board" theory-if it works, be-
lieve it.
13. Citing D. Armentano, Antitrust and
Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure
(1982); Brozen, Dialogue, Are Economists
Taking Over?, in Changing Antitrust Stan-
dards 31 (Conf. Bd. Research Bull. No.
144, 1983) (where collusive arrangements
do not bar entrance, no need to be con-
cerned about consumer welfare). The trial
court also cited R. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox (1978) for the proposition that
only those arrangements resulting in a re-
duction of output should be condemned as
clivity of members of such a
conspiracy to cheat and "free ride" is
assumed and taken into account by ra-
tional maximizers in deciding whether
to enter into such an agreement in the
first place. Since, by definition, the de-
fendants are rational maximizers, it is
impossible for them to have contem-
plated or entered into the type of con-
spiracy plaintiff claims they entered.
Even assuming the unlikely event that
"naked" restraints of trade. Since the
agreement did not explicitly call for a re-
duction in or limitation of output, the
agreement-if it did exist-was character-
ized by the trial court as "partially
clothed" and "an ancillary agreement" re-
straining trade rather than a "naked" or
non-ancillary restraint of trade. See
Rothery Storage & Van v. Atlas Van Lines,
792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,
J., distinguishing between the "naked" and
the "partially clothed" and the "ancillary"
and the "non-ancillary" on the grounds of
whether the restraint is pursuant to a par-
tial integration to make the main agree-
ment more effective). Here, the parties
have used the cartel to integrate partially
their functions; the agreement on prices is
clearly ancillary to the main agreement
and designed to make the integration more
effective. Hence, there is much merit to
the trial court's classification of this re-
straint as "ancillary and not naked."
In any event, Rothery requires a showing
of relevant product and geographic mar-
kets as well as a showing of monopoly
power in the markets defined before a vio-
lation of § 1 may be found. In the instant
case, plaintiff refused to introduce such evi-
dence, arguing that it had filed a § I case
not a § 2 monopolization case. We reject
plaintiff's argument that proof of relevant
markets and power in the market defined
are irrelevant in a § 1 case. The Model as-
sumes that economic efficiency as defined
by The Model, see n. 3, supra, is the sole
goal of antitrust policy. And there can be
no showing of either a decrease in eco-
nomic efficiency or a violation of the Act
unless there is proof of a reduction in out-
put through the exercise of monopoly
power in a relevant market. Hence, §§ 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act are aimed at the
same evil and mean the same thing.
March 1987]
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the defendants stupidly engaged in the
activity alleged, the trial court held
that it should not intervene, for fear
that it might make a mistake. As
Judge Easterbrook has perceptively
and humbly written: "judicial errors
that tolerate baleful practices are self-
correcting, while erroneous condem-
nations are not."' 14
Citing Continental TV., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97
S.Ct. 2459, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977), the
trial court rejected plaintiff's claims
that the defendants' vertical restraints
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. The
court reiterated its analysis of why it
was irrational and impossible for the
defendants to impose the vertical re-
straints through a horizontal agree-
ment among themselves and why it
would not be an antitrust injury to the
plaintiff even if the defendants had in
fact done so. The court further found
that if each firm imposed the distribu-
tional restraints individually, each one
must have done so to prevent "free
riders," the scourge of rational mar-
keting. 15 Even though widgets are
sold strictly on price, are fungible, and
require no repair or warranty work,
the court still held that it was com-
pletely within the prerogative of the
rationality of each supplier to impose
the vertical restraints-including price
restraints-in order to prevent what
each supplier perceived to be "free rid-
ing." Any distributional practice by a
distributor objected to by its supplier
and lessening the supplier's return on
the item was defined as "free riding"
and a threat to the right of the supplier
to maximize profits.
The trial court also rejected the
claim that Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Ser-
vice Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct.
1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), required
a finding of per se illegality for vertical
price fixing, noting that the Court in
that case was not presented with the
question of whether the per se rule
should be abandoned.16 The court
opined that if this Court, "a Court
14. Easterbrook, n. 7, supra, at 3.
15. The trial court summarily rejected
plaintiff's claim that "the free rider con-
cept is a clich6 indiscriminately used to
make reprehensible the very competition
the antitrust laws were designed to pro-
tect." Citing Pitofsky, In Defense of Dis-
counters: The No Frills Case for a Per Se
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71
Geo.L.J. 1487 (1983). The trial court
stated:
Were this court to entertain such an
argument it would plunge the court
into an examination of the permissi-
ble scope of the property and con-
tract rights of those imposing the
restraint-moral questions com-
pletely irrelevant to this dispute.
Such an inquiry would upset the
symmetry of The Model by permit-
ting a questioning of the rationality
of the "rationality" assumption,
and requiring an inquiry into the
kind of legal system The Model as-
sumes is in existence to give effect
to The Model's prediction. This
courts cannot do, lest the closed
nature of The Model be destroyed,
discretion invade the analysis, and
decision-makers relying upon The
Model be deprived of the use of de-
ductive logic in its application.
We agree with the trial court's assess-
ment of the plaintiff's invidious and sub-
versive argument. The internal coherence
of The Model would be completely de-
stroyed and its ability to predict outcomes
with certainty would be eliminated if such
an argument were to be entertained.
16. In Monsanto, we rejected the attempt of
the Solicitor General and amici to raise the
issue because it had not been argued below
and not because the argument lacked
merit. The trial court held that the logic
used in Sylvania and by the advocates of
The Model, when coupled with the policy
assumptions of The Model, at least re-
quires that vertical price fixing be mea-
sured on a rule of reason basis, if not be
declared per se lawful.
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which a few short years thereafter
came down with the Matsushita deci-
sion," had been presented with the is-
sue, it would have held that the per se
prohibition on vertical price fixing
should be abandoned. The court con-
cluded this part of its opinion with the
observation that it is the purpose of
the legal system to protect the prop-
erty and contract rights of suppliers or
anyone else in a position to bargain for
or impose such restraints. The court
asserted that its role was to remain
neutral towards the economic activity
of free persons and not to condemn
those imposing restraints for doing the
"rational and efficient thing." The
court observed: "That's what free en-
terprise is all about, and it behooves
courts to be vigilant in protecting and
promoting free enterprise by prevent-
ing governmental meddling with it and
by bringing the full force and effect of
the law to bear in protecting property
and contract rights of the sort defend-
ants have exercised here."
The court rejected the plaintiff's
assertions that markets are not per-
fectly competitive, that the defendants'
motives and incentives to engage in
the cartel may encompass a much
wider range of objectives than just ob-
taining long-term monopoly profits
and supra-competitive prices, and that
the evidence constitutes a "lay down"
case of conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act. The court did so on the
grounds "that Matsushita establishes
that the sole goal of the antitrust laws
is to achieve economic efficiency as
that concept is defined by the neoclas-
17. The fact that plaintiffis in bankruptcy is
irrelevant to our analysis. Plaintiff's diffi-
culties could be caused by innumerable fac-
tors, including its failure to act rationally
and maximize profits by joining the
Consortium when the opportunity was
sical model of economic theorizing
and that The Model indicates that re-
ality cannot behave in the manner
claimed by the plaintiff." The court
further noted that the plaintiff is "a
shining example of the validity of The
Model since it has entered the market
and gained a 5% share in the face of
the alleged cartel." 17 Consequently,
the court found the case was "one
where summary judgment should be
the rule and not the exception" and
that the plaintiff's claim that the court
was trampling on its jury trial rights
was "unfounded because there were no
facts that could be in controversy."
The trial judge stated: "If you wish to
be philosophical about it, The Model
dictates not only what the law is but
also what the facts are." In view of the
"obviousness" of the dictates of The
Model and the plaintiff's awareness
thereof, the court granted the defend-
ant's Rule 11 motion for sanctions. In
light of this Court's holding in Matsu-
shita and the clear dictates of The
Model adopted in that decision for de-
termining antitrust disputes, the court
held that the plaintiff had filed a "friv-
olous lawsuit" that it knew or should
have known was frivolous, and
awarded defendants attorneys' fees
and costs of $650,000.
A panel of the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's decision, per
curian. Citing various law review ar-
ticles authored by members of the
panel, that court found the plaintiff's
appeal wholly without merit and an
attempt "to undermine public and ju-
dicial confidence in the teachings of
presented. In any event, plaintiff's entry
into the market and securing of a 5% mar-
ket share indicate that entry barriers were
not insuperable and that they were entry
barriers of the type which are inherent in
this type of business.
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Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer and
the principles on which this great na-
tion and our free enterprise system are
based." The court agreed that the
plaintiff's counsel had demonstrated
"utter contempt for the truth by at-
tempting to demonstrate a reality in-
consistent with the assumptions of The
Model" and entered further sanctions
against plaintiff's counsel of $500,000.
That court concluded its brief opinion
with the observation "that one would
think any reasonably informed plain-
tiff's lawyer, regardless of the claim,
would think more than twice about fil-
ing any antitrust lawsuits in the courts
of this Circuit."
On appeal to this Court, plaintiff
has attacked every finding below, reli-
ance upon The Model to "dictate real-
ity and the goals of antitrust policy,"
and the awards of sanctions under
Rule 11. The plaintiff has also argued
that the grant of the defendant's mo-
tion below violates "the spirit, letter,
and common understanding of Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, makes a travesty of the division
of judge and jury functions dictated by
the Seventh Amendment, and repeals
the Sherman Act." Defendants have
urged us to affirm summarily the
lower courts' findings and the entry of
Rule 11 sanctions, and have included a
demand that this Court award further
sanctions for plaintiff's "temerity" in
filing this appeal.
We affirm the holdings below, in-
cluding the imposition of sanctions,
but deny defendant's motion for fur-
ther sanctions from this Court.
II
This case is governed by the prin-
ciples laid down in Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
474 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986).
In that case we held that an antitrust
plaintiff responding to a motion for
summary judgment "must establish
that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether [defendants] entered
into an illegal conspiracy that caused
... [plaintiff] 'antitrust injury.' " 106
S.Ct., at 1355-1356. We reject the
plaintiff's assertion that the burden
should fall the other way; that the mo-
vant must establish initially that there
is no genuine issue of material fact by
its motion and supporting documents
and affidavits. Plaintiff claims that the
movant should not be permitted to
maintain there is no genuine issue of
material fact by simply relying upon
an "abstract model of a world which
does not exist and nothing else to sup-
port its motion." Although subsection
(e) of Rule 56 speaks in terms of the
motion being "supported as provided
in this Rule," we held in Matsushita
that parties relying on The Model in
support of a motion for summary
judgment in an antitrust case automat-
ically support and carry their burden
of demonstrating there is no genuine
issue of fact. The Model does it for
them.
In that case, we relied upon The
Model to establish the following pro-
positions: that the sole motivation of
firms in a perfectly competitive market
is to maximize profit; that claims of
predatory pricing (supporting below-
cost prices in one market with high
prices in another) are generally un-
likely to occur in any circumstances;
that defendants are not likely to regain
losses from a predatory pricing cam-
paign and thus have no motive to en-
gage in such conduct; and, that
"courts should not permit factfinders
to infer conspiracies when such infer-
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ences are implausible [implausibility as
determined by the predictions of The
Model], because the effect of such [ju-
dicial] practices is often to deter pro-
competitive conduct." 106 S.Ct., at
1360. As the dissenters in Matsushita
pointed out, we totally ignored the
plaintiffs' evidence that the defendants
had been selling goods in this country
at a substantial loss for a long period
of time. We knew that profit max-
imization-not growth or market
share-was the only motive the
defendants could be assumed to have
18. Intent to exclude competitors should be
held irrelevant even if it were possible that
the defendants could have had such an
irrational motive. Judge Posner has
observed:
[I]f conduct is not objectively an-
ticompetitive the fact that it was
motivated by hostility to competi-
tors ("these turkeys") is irrele-
vant....
Most businessmen don't like
their competitors, or for that matter
competition. They want to make as
much money as possible and getting
a monopoly is one way of making a
lot of money. That is fine, how-
ever, so long as they do not use
methods calculated to make con-
sumers worse off in the long run.
Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (CA7
1986).
Plaintiff has pointed out that Judge Pos-
ner's position is inconsistent with the bind-
ing precedent of Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S.
464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458,
464 (1962), where we said: " We believe
that summary procedures should be used
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation
where motive and intent play leading roles
.... (emphasis supplied). Judge Posner
regularly ignores binding precedent. On
occasion, the practice produces worthwhile
insights, even though a bit inconsistent
with the usual role of lower court judges.
By ignoring intent and relying on the fixed,
meaningful, and knowable concepts of
"consumer welfare," "ancillary restraints,"
and "reductions in output," we can make
the law certain and predictable in cases like
this one. To the extent that Poller holds
under The Model. 106 S.Ct., at
1365.18 Consequently, requiring sup-
porting affidavits and evidence from a
summary judgment movant about
facts admissible in evidence is unnec-
essary in antitrust cases since The
Model itself demonstrates the only
plausible set of facts. Under Rule 56,
as presently written, the party moved
against can still try to challenge the
motion by filing counter-affidavits or
other evidence questioning whether
the predictions of The Model follow
from the assumptions of The Model. 19
otherwise, it is distinguished. If it cannot
be distinguished, it is overruled. See n. 20,
infra.
19. This Court relied upon then-Professor
Easterbrook's analysis of the Matsushita
case to decide that case. 106 S.Ct., at 1359,
n. 15. Easterbrook's analysis was not
based on references to the record of the
case. Indeed, it demonstrates that we do
not need a record. His analysis posited the
assumptions of The Model and its inexora-
ble conclusion that predatory pricing could
not take place over such a sustained period
of time in light of the risks of new entry
and cheating by the parties alleged to have
conspired. From these uncontrovertible
facts derived from the truths of The Model
he could conclude that the defendants were
"engaged in hard competition" rather than
predatory pricing. Easterbrook, n. 7,
supra, at 27.
We clearly adopted Easterbrook's
method for deciding antitrust cases by de-
termining whether the predictions of The
Model followed from the policy and fac-
tual assumptions underlying The Model
without reference to the purposes of Con-
gress in adopting the antitrust laws or to
the record of the case in order to determine
whether the factual assumptions of The
Model were in effect in the case before the
court. Thus we overturned the Court of
Appeals in Matsushita on the issue of
whether there was a material question of
fact regarding whether defendants had
conspired because the Court of Appeals
did not consider the dictates of The Model
indicating that "it was as plausible to con-
clude petitioners' price-cutting behavior
was independent and not conspiratorial."
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Plaintiff would have us reverse
Matsushita and hold that a court
should consider facts which diverge
from the reality assumed by and the
consequences predicted by The Model.
This we cannot permit. To do so
would be to return to the now discred-
ited view that antitrust cases are
"complex" and require juries to weigh
issues of motive and intent along with
facts unique to the case.20
In this case, the defendants, as
rational maximizers operating in mar-
kets where there is an inverse relation-
ship between prices charged and quan-
tity demanded, would have sought to
maximize the difference between their
costs and the prices charged. But if
they obtained excessive profits, the as-
sumed condition of free entry would
mean that manufacturers of other
106 S.Ct., at 1353. In effect, we held that
the court must grant the motion unless it
appears that the predictions of The Model
do not follow from the assumptions of The
Model. A party challenging this logical
holding certainly faces an uphill battle,
perhaps an insuperable one. Short of re-
pealing The Model and the reasoning pro-
cess associated with it, we see no other
conclusion in motions by defendants for
summary judgment in antitrust cases after
Matsushita.
20. It should be readily apparent that we
have been creating different tests for sum-
mary judgment for different classes of liti-
gation. In the antitrust arena, we have
evolved from a posture of holding that
summary judgment should be rarely
granted in cases where motive and intent
are often important issues, to the posture
of granting summary judgment motions for
defendants wherever The Model dictates
that the facts alleged are not plausible.
Matsushita is but a confirmation of that
trend and not only authorizes a trial judge
to ignore the general obligation of the pro-
ponent of a motion to carry the initial bur-
den of supporting the motion with evi-
dence, but also to ignore the obligation to
draw the inferences from the facts in the
light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion as required by Poller v. CBS,
products would instantly enter the
widget market to drive down prices to
cost. On the other hand, if they were
conspiring to cut prices below cost,
they would not last long in the market
for widgets. Consequently, their
prices must have been neither too high
nor too low-but just right. They
proved this by showing no new entry
took place and none of the members of
the Consortium failed. Therefore, the
burden shifted to the plaintiff to find a
factual dispute The Model tells us is a
genuine dispute-a burden the record
indicates that the plaintiff has failed to
even attempt to carry.
Matsushita's holding that "courts
should not permit factfnders to infer
conspiracies when such inferences are
implausible, 21 106 S.Ct., at 1360,
goes beyond the procedural technicali-
368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7
L.Ed.2d 458, 464 (1962), and United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct.
993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176, 177 (1962).
It should be clear that Matsushita also di-
rects a trial judge to invade the traditional
function of the jury, at least in antitrust
cases, and decide whether the plausible in-
ferences drawn favor one party over the
other and enter judgment accordingly.
The language in Poller, supra, "[wie be-
lieve that summary procedures should be
used sparingly in complex antitrust litiga-
tion," has been honored in its breach for at
least the past ten years and that reality
should be expressly recognized and ap-
proved by this Court. Poller has long been
overruled in fact, if not in law. It is appar-
ent that "trial by affidavit" has been, and
is, a substitute for "trial by jury," the
"hallmark of 'even handed' justice," Poller,
supra, at 473, 82 S.Ct. at 491, 7 L.Ed.2d at
464, once we have the insights of economic
analysis to help us determine what the
facts are and guide us to the right an-
swer-the record and other considerations
to the contrary notwithstanding.
21. Implicit in this holding is the assump-
tion that plausibility is a matter for the
court to decide, not the jury. See n. 20,
supra.
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ties of which party has the burden of
supporting a claim that there is no fac-
tual controversy in summary judg-
ment motions. It establishes the sub-
stantive rule that where The Model
determines that the conduct alleged as
violating the antitrust laws is not plau-
sible in light of the assumptions of The
Model, no violation of the antitrust
laws can in fact have taken place. We
coupled our plausibility holding with
the observation that "petitioners had
no motive to enter into the alleged
conspiracy" and that "as presumably
rational businesses, petitioners had
every incentive not to engage in the
conduct with which they are charged,
22. See R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145
(1978); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revis-
ited, 23 J.Law & Econ. 289 (1980); Easter-
brook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-
strategies, 48 U.Chi.L.Rev. 263 (1981); see
also Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
63 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1984).
23. Plaintiff's suggestion that this Court
ended up analyzing the predictions and as-
sumptions of The Model rather than the
facts of the case in Matsushita borders on
the contemptuous. In support of this wild
allegation, plaintiff points out that the
Court's basis for rejecting the plaintiff's ex-
pert witness testimony in that case was this
Court's reliance upon the abstract theo-
rizing of The Model rather than upon a re-
view of the record and a finding that the
expert testimony did not present an issue of
fact. Be that as it may, we have held that
The Model does determine both what the
law is and what the facts are. See nn. 12 &
20, supra. To hold otherwise would under-
mine The Model; it would be like rejecting
one of the basic postulates of Euclidian ge-
ometry-the entire system would fail and
then where would we be?
Plaintiff also claims that subsequent ac-
tions by the Administration, which sup-
ported the defendants in Matsushita in en-
tering into a trade pact limiting imports of
semiconductors from Japan, indicate an
Administration belief that Japan's indus-
tries engage in cartel activity orchestrated
by MITI and engage in below-cost selling
for sustained periods of time for reasons
not accounted for by The Model. Plaintiff
for its likely effect would be to gener-
ate losses for petitioners with no corre-
sponding gain." 106 S.Ct., at 1361.
We found no plausible motive to en-
gage in anticompetitive conduct in
Matsushita, it will be remembered, by
virtue of an examination of the dic-
tates of The Model, according to Bork,
McGee, Easterbrook, and others. 22
Their theorizing told us the defend-
ants, firms from Japan selling electron-
ics products in the United States, were
acting pursuant to The Model and that
they necessarily were acting "ration-
ally" according to the standards of ra-
tionality posited by Bork, McGee,
Easterbrook, and others.23  We ac-
points to a Reagan Administration offi-
cial's defense of the trade agreement in the
semiconductor industry limiting the im-
port of semiconductors into the United
States. The official suggested the low
prices of imports from Japan were the
product of long-term overcapacity sup-
ported by high fixed prices within Japan's
protected domestic market. It was sug-
gested that this was the product of official
governmental policy targeting the industry
for development and export trade. The
policy was implemented by subsidies, trade
barriers against imports into Japan's do-
mestic market, and MITI coordinating Ja-
pan's exports at low prices on world mar-
kets. See C. Prestowitz, In Defense of
Semiconductor Pact, Wall St. J., p. 30, col.
4, (Sept. 26, 1986). Plaintiff claims that the
same thing was happening in the markets
at issue in Matsushita, but this Court re-
fused to consider the facts of the case be-
cause we became "bewitched and enam-
ored by the child-like simplicity of the
neoclassical model and its compatibility
with our unexamined ideological beliefs."
We refuse to reconsider Matsushita or
plaintiff's intemperate observations about
that decision. We are a court of law, not a
political body like the Congress or some
agency of the Executive branch. Our duty
is to find the rules, apply them to the facts,
and impose the conclusion wherever it may
take us. The science of economics has
given us our rules, The Model has given us
our facts, and we need only multiply the
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cordingly found the conduct alleged in
that case, predatory pricing, to be
speculative, rarely tried, never success-
ful, and impossible to believe. Because
of the rationality assumption, we also
found the defendants in that case
lacked a motive to engage in the alleg-
edly illegal conduct because The
Model indicated the conduct would
generate losses for them- "losses" as
defined by The Model. The claim that
these are all issues of fact which a
plaintiff is entitled to have a jury con-
sider and determine, received no atten-
tion from the majority opinion-and
justly so. For The Model, which is ap-
plicable at all times and in all circum-
stances, defines not only what is the
law, but also what is the reality that
will be allowed to be considered fact
relevant to the case.
one times the other to reach the right
conclusion.
24. Although Bork's reading of the legisla-
tive history of the Sherman Act suggesting
Congress intended it to serve efficiency
goals only, R. Bork, The Antitrust Para-
dox 50-71 (1978), has been persuasively
challenged, Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Chal-
lenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65 (1982); Fox,
The Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 1140,
1154, n. 76 (1981), we can only interpret
the language Congress used. Determining
the legislative history of any statute is a
tricky business not to be engaged in unless
the language of the statute is ambiguous.
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 490, 37 S.Ct. 192, 196, 61 L.Ed. 442,
455 (1917) ("[W]hen words are free from
doubt, they must be taken as the final ex-
pression of the legislative intent, and are
not to be added to or subtracted from by
considerations drawn ... from any extra-
neous source."). We do not see anything
ambiguous about the Sherman Act. It
clearly instructs us to hold joint activity
"in restraint of trade" illegal. That lan-
guage invokes a concept embracing eco-
nomic analysis and is limited to determin-
ing whether a restraint has occurred in the
Thus it is that we have deter-
mined that the only purpose of the
Sherman Act is to achieve economic
efficiency as defined by The Model, the
opinions of the members of the Con-
gress that passed the Sherman Act to
the contrary notwithstanding. 24 In
Matsushita and in Sylvania we have
also held that The Model dictates
what will be permitted to be consid-
ered the facts for purposes of analyz-
ing a case on appeal. 25 The friction-
less functioning of The Model
demands such an approach lest we be
confronted with uncertainty and the
interjection of our own personal values
into the process of decision. To para-
phrase Mr. Justice Roberts: When
conduct of private corporations is
challenged as not conforming to the
mandate of the antitrust laws, the judi-
economic sense. Determining the eco-
nomic meaning of the concept is all that we
are doing here when we employ the objec-
tive model from the science of economics
to fashion rules determining which re-
straints are lawful and which not.
25. It is not uncommon for there to be a dif-
ference in the version of the facts relied
upon by trial and appellate courts in decid-
ing a case, myths about due process to the
contrary notwithstanding. See, e.g., Telex
Corp. v. IBM, 367 F.Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla.
1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (CA10 1975),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802, 96 S.Ct. 8, 46
L.Ed.2d 244 (1975) (trial court finding on
cost of developing interfaces ignored by
circuit court, in defining relevant market).
A comparison of the various court opin-
ions in the Matsushita case illustrates that
not only does the version of the facts con-
sidered by each court vary significantly,
but that this Court need not become in-
volved with the facts at all where a scien-
tific and objective economic model can be
relied upon to determine what the facts are
which should be permitted to be consid-
ered in deciding the case. The error of the
lower courts in both disputes was to ignore
the assumptions of The Model in determin-
ing what would be permitted to be the facts
for purposes of the analysis, reality to the
contrary notwithstanding.
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cial branch of the Government has
only one duty-to lay the section of
the antitrust laws (as defined by the
predictions of The Model) which is in-
voked beside the conduct which The
Model assumes has taken place, and to
decide whether the latter squares with
the former.2 6 These are the substan-
tive implications of our decision in
Matsushita and they are the principles
which that case and the dictates of
The Model require that we apply
today.
Applying these principles to the
facts of this case, it is obvious that the
conduct plaintiff alleges took place
could not have happened and that the
alleged evidence suggesting otherwise
is false; or, if it did happen, could not
have worked in a way which caused
plaintiff antitrust injury.2 7 It would
have been irrational for the defendants
26. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62
(1936). As a result of its squaring process
in that case, the Court found the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act invaded the reserved
power of the states, was beyond the power
of the federal government, and was an in-
appropriate exercise of the federal spend-
ing power. In this case, our only function
is to lay the predictions of The Model
down beside the assumptions behind it and
see if the former square with the latter. In
the unlikely event that they failed to do so,
it would be up to Congress to change the
law or the facts, although Congress can no
more change The Model and the assump-
tions upon which it is based than King Ca-
nute could hold back the tide. That is why
we commonly refer to "economic laws" in
the sense of immutable rules when speak-
ing of The Model. It is beyond the power
of this Court to legislate, just as it is be-
yond the power of Congress to tamper
with, the assumptions underlying The
Model. Our job is to apply, deductively,
The Model to the facts as defined by The
Model and not to engage in policy making,
the consideration of irrelevant "facts" not
accounted for by The Model, or the invo-
cation of such vague and poetic concepts as
fairness, justice, concentrated economic
power, and competitive process. We prefer
clear, precise, and rigorous concepts like
"allocative efficiency," "ancillary re-
straints," "consumer welfare," "Pareto op-
timality," and "market power."
27. Plaintiff argues that our antitrust
"standing" decisions are irrational and im-
possible to reconcile. Plaintiff has also ar-
gued that the decisions are impossible to
reconcile with the plain language of the
statute and the congressional purpose be-
hind the antitrust laws. Plaintiff has mis-
understood our standing opinions. In anti-
trust litigation we have not used the
"standing" concept as we have used it else-
where in the law to dispose of disputes not
committed to the courts by Congress or
suits not amenable to resolution by the ju-
dicial process. Rather, we have used it to
dispose of cases where someone is admit-
tedly injured in their business or property,
but the chain of causation is interrupted by
an intervening party. See Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52
L.Ed.2d 707 (1977).
Furthermore, in Associated General Con-
tractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74
L.Ed.2d 723 (1983), we held that the scope
of the duties created by the antitrust laws
and the determination of who should be
able to invoke the legal process to enforce
those rights was dependent upon common
law standards in effect at the time of the
passage of the Sherman Act. Id., at 531-
534, 103 S.Ct., at 905-906, 74 L.Ed.2d at
733-736.
In one stroke we incorporated a wide
range of judge-made limitations upon the
right to invoke the private treble damage
remedies like privity, foreseeability, proxi-
mate cause, certainty of damage proof, and
so on. In this way the otherwise unlimited
liability to the world that a literal reading
of the damage provisions of the antitrust
laws would seem to contemplate can be
subjected to the informed discretion of the
courts to dismiss claims they believe are
"too remote," "inconsequential," outside
the "target area" of the alleged violation,
or conduct which ought not be found a vio-
lation of the antitrust laws in the first in-
stance because The Model so dictates.
We further restricted access to the courts
by antitrust plaintiffs in Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, 475 U.S. -, 107
S.Ct. 484 (1986), by requiring private
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against a
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to have entered into the agreement
and impossible for them to have car-
ried it out if they did enter into it for
the reasons stated by the court below.
In the implausible event that the de-
fendants did attempt to carry out the
alleged agreement, courts should hesi-
tate before intervening because the
market will correct the situation rap-
idly through new entry or cheating by
members of the cartel. Judicial inter-
ference with the free market is a form
of government intervention and it
should be presumed that any form of
government intervention with the
functioning of the market is likely to
produce blunders interfering with the
self-correcting and efficient solutions
of the free market.2 8
In light of the dictates of The
merger allegedly violating § 7 of the Clay-
ton Act to show threatened damage to
them of the type the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent and that the damage
flowed from the merger. By imposing this
standing burden on the private § 7 plain-
tiff, we were able to shut down such litiga-
tion unless it could be shown the merger
violated the Sherman Act. This has
proven to be the case because one only
needs to show an incipient threat to com-
petition to show a § 7 violation; by requir-
ing proof of threatened damage of the sort
prevented by the antitrust laws flowing
from the violation in order to have stand-
ing, private plaintiffs are not able to bring
incipiency cases. They are forced to prove
a Sherman Act violation in order to have
standing.
In this case we could hold the plaintiff
lacks standing to bring a treble damage ac-
tion since the sole purpose of the antitrust
laws is to maximize consumer welfare, not
to protect competitor interests. Thus we
have upheld the right of consumers claim-
ing to be victimized by a price-fixing con-
spiracy to maintain a treble damage ac-
tion. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready.
457 U.S. 465, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73 L.Ed.2d
149 (1982). This reading of the statute im-
plicitly means that a competitor trampled
upon by a rival business that is injuring
consumer interests lacks "standing" to sue.
Model, the courts below were emi-
nently correct in dismissing the counts
of the complaint alleging horizontal
restraints of trade and in imposing
sanctions for the temerity of the plain-
tiff's suggesting that reality could be
otherwise and that a court should
interfere with the self-correcting
processes of the market if the defend-
ants did indeed engage in the irra-
tional and implausible conduct the
plaintiff claims they engaged in.
III
The plaintiff's vertical claims de-
serve a separate and more sympathetic
treatment in light of the elliptical
treatment of these issues in Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d
Injury to the competitor is, at best, "indi-
rect" and the result of a long-term injury-
if any--"directly" suffered by consumers
deprived of the competitor's presence in
the market. The consumer, in turn, must
be "directly" injured in his business or
property in order to have standing. See Il-
linois Brick, supra.
If, of course, the plaintiff passes these
"standing" tests, the issue still remains
whether the assumptions behind The
Model will permit one to draw the infer-
ence that the defendants operating in a per-
fectly competitive market would have any
motive to conspire or rational expectancy
that a contract or conspiracy to fix prices
or divide markets would succeed in light of
the assumptions and logic of The Model.
If not, it would be impossible for a con-
sumer claiming "direct" injury to be in-
jured "by reason of" something prohibited
by the antitrust laws. See Matsushita,
supra. In light of our holding that it is
logically impossible for a plaintiff to prove
that the assumptions of The Model do not
produce the outcomes The Model predicts,
any further commentary on the issue of
"standing" in such circumstances is unnec-
essary. As a practical matter no such suits
can be maintained on the merits in light of
what we hold today.
28. See Easterbrook, ante, at 524, and n.14.
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775 (1984). In that case, tried on aper
se theory of liability for vertical price
fixing, this Court was confronted with
a situation in which the defendant and
others attempted to raise for the first
time, on appeal, the question of
whether or not vertical price fixing
ought to be condemned on a per se ba-
sis. Applying well-settled principles of
judicial review, we refused to consider
an issue on appeal that was not liti-
gated below. In view of the Court of
Appeals opinion in that case,2 9 this
Court necessarily focused on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence from which it
might be inferred that a contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy took place in
the circumstances of that case for
Sherman Act purposes. Whether this
Court would have held that the con-
duct in question violated the Sherman
Act and did so on a per se basis if the
issue were properly before the Court,
was left open to conjecture. Today, we
settle that conjecture by holding that
all vertical restraints should be pre-
sumed per se lawful-a conclusion we
believe mandated by the economic
model we have held dictates what the
antitrust laws are meant to achieve as
well as by the facts permitted to be
considered by a court in analyzing
whether the predictions of The Model
are satisfied by the assumptions behind
The Model in a particular case.
29. 684 F.2d 1226 (CA7 1982) (asserting
that proof of termination following com-
petitor complaints was sufficient to send
the issue of whether there was a conspiracy
to terminate the plaintiff to a jury).
30. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price and Market Division
II, 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966). Plaintiff's offer
to prove that the restraints were imposed
for other reasons was rightfully rejected.
31. See Posner, The Next Step in the Anti-
trust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 6, 9
(1981). While plaintiff has invoked the old
In view of the possibility that the
plaintiff and others may have been rea-
sonably misled by the true meaning of
our opinion in Monsanto, it is under-
standable that the plaintiff may have
filed this suit and pursued appeals
from dismissal of these claims on the
theory that we meant to reaffirm the
outmoded per se prohibition of vertical
price fixing. The plaintiff is to be pit-
ied, not punished, for following this
course of action.
It should be reasonably clear by
now that rational maximizers operat-
ing in a perfectly competitive market
will only impose vertical restraints,
including resale price maintenance
agreements, where it is efficient to do
so-efficient as defined by The Model.
In other words, suppliers will not im-
pose vertical restraints where it will re-
strict output to do so.30 The Model
assumes defendants are rational maxi-
mizers operating in perfectly competi-
tive markets. On this record and be-
cause of our reading of Matsushita as
excluding evidence suggesting that de-
fendants acted in fact contrary to the
dictates of The Model, ante, at 526-
527, the logic of holding vertical price
and non-price restraints to be per se
lawful is inescapable. Symmetry in the
treatment of vertical price and non-
price restraints demands such a re-
sult.3' A system of restricted distribu-
clich6 that "consistency is the hobgoblin
of small minds," plaintiff has not demon-
strated any affirmative reason for dis-
turbing the neatness of a symmetrical rule
which is inherently consistent and easily
understood. It is not persuasive to claim
that the congressional repeal of the Fair
Trade Exemption and the congressional
prohibition on the Antitrust Division's ar-
guing for declassifying vertical price fixing
as a per se violation in Monsanto is evi-
dence of an intent to apply a per se rule to
such conduct. When Congress repealed
the Fair Trade Exemption it did just that;
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tion is designed to maximize rationally
the efficient distribution of a supplier's
product. Who are we to second-guess
the rational judgment of a property
owner in determining how to dis-
tribute its product, thus opening the
door to "free riding" on the property
rights of the distributor?32
IV
In view of the plaintiff's confu-
sion over, the status of vertical price
fixing, we do not think sanctions are
warranted for its having filed the peti-
tion for certiorari. Moreover, four
members of this Court believe that the
case presented sufficient grounds for
review so as to vote in favor of grant-
ing the petition. Speaking for at least
a few of that number, this case
presented us with the opportunity to
clear up some loose ends, carry Matsu-
shita to its logical conclusion, and
complete this Court's termination of
its long and tortuous journey with an-
titrust litigation. For those reasons
alone, we think it inappropriate to im-
pose further sanctions on the plaintiff
in view of the opportunity it has given
this Court to clarify the meaning of
the Sherman Act. We do so despite
the rhetorical question at the end of
it did not enact a per se prohibition. See
Posner, supra. Moreover, we must apply
the language that Congress used, not what
it may have intended by that language.
Since we have held that the Sherman Act is
a short-hand expression of The Model and
it is our duty only to compare the assump-
tions of The Model with its predictions,
there is no utility in attempting to discern
what Congress intended as opposed to
what we have held Congress said-let
alone compare what Congress intended or
the assumptions underlying The Model to
the reality of this case.
32. The fact that vertical price restraints are
used primarily in the sale of goods like
candy, blue jeans, and the like, where it is
the plaintiff's brief asking what is left
of the Sherman Act if this Court up-
holds dismissal of the plaintiff's
claims. That question will, of course,
be answered when and if the case
arises and when, if ever, this Court
deems it necessary to grant certiorari
in another antitrust case. In view of
the absence of any such litigation cur-
rently pending in the federal courts
and the phalanx of lower court judges
well-educated at corporate sponsored
two-week courses in the right kind of
law and economics, we do not believe
it necessary to be worried about the
possibility of significant antitrust liti-
gation taking place in the future. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Justice CATO, concurring.
I concur solely for the purpose of
stressing the significance of the discov-
ery of the neoclassical economic model
and its use in law generally. We have
been too reticent in our willingness to
bring this insightful tool of the modern
science of economics to bear on legal
issues generally. The word should go
forth, not just in antitrust cases where
this Court has been gradually shifting
the law to fit the predictions of The
Model for at least twenty-five years,
questionable whether there is a need for
warranty and repair work, does not ex-
haust the possible rationales for what con-
stitutes free riding. For our purposes, and
in light of the dictates of The Model, any-
thing the distributor believes is a reason for
imposing the restraint will, ipso facto, de-
fine what free riders are out to gain at the
honest distributor's expense. Courts are
duty-bound to enforce contracts imposed
by suppliers restricting free riding of any
sort by their distributors or third parties
else freedom of contract becomes an empty
right. See Goldberg, The Free Rider Prob-
lem, Imperfect Pricing and the Economics
of Retailing Services, 79 Nw.U.L.Rev. 736
(1984).
[Vol. 38
SHERMAN WIDGET v. SMITH WIDGETS
Cite as 38 HASTINGS L.J. - (1987)
but in all fields of law, that we now
have a model to end judicial discre-
tion. The light provided by The
Model can serve to illuminate a vast
range of vexing issues regularly
brought before courts and legislatures
and show the clear path to the right
answer. 1
For example, we have been in-
structed that from an economic per-
spective, the regulation of rape by
criminal sanctions simply demon-
strates a solution to a problem of mar-
ket failure.2 The implications of such
an approach and whether and in what
way such conduct should or should
not be regulated by criminal law for
efficiency purposes are startling.3 For
example, if one sees the criminal law
and the law of torts as ways of coerc-
ing rapists from engaging in involun-
tary exchanges that injure non-con-
senting parties, the economic sanctions
imposed may be justified as a way of
adjusting upward the costs of engaging
in such activity in order to discourage
the rapist from bypassing the market.
It is, of course, "efficient to use differ-
ent sanctions depending on an of-
fender's wealth."' 4 Consequently, we
as a society should reserve criminal
sanctions for rape for the non-affluent
and apply tort remedies for rape for
the affluent.
1. Posner has prophetically observed:
"My own view is that the proper domain
of economics includes all of its fruitful ap-
plications-economics cannot be defined in
accordance with some preconceived idea of
what 'economic' institutions are." Posner,
Retribution and Related Concepts of Pun-
ishment, 9 J. Legal St. 71, 73 (1980). It
must be clear by now that the range of
fruitful applications of the science includes
all activities where human motivation
plays any role at all. This is so because
The Model's fixed assumption that
whatever the individual chooses is rational
and rational is whatever the individual
chooses provides a fixed factual constraint
upon judicial discretion to divine rules gov-
erning human behavior contrary to the as-
sumption of rationality.
2. See Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 Colum.L.Rev. 1193,
1198-1199 (1985). Judge Posner instructs
us that rape is a bad thing but that it is use-
ful to think that "the prohibition against
rape is to the marriage and sex 'market' as
the prohibition against theft is to explicit
markets in goods and services." Only "con-
sensual relationships can create wealth,
and therefore be efficient." Id., at 1199.
3. Ibid. In the same article we are in-
structed that it is "hard for an economist
to understand why the voluntary exchange
of valuable goods should be criminal." Id.,
at 1200. Among the examples cited as vol-
untary exchanges are unsuccessful conspir-
acies to commit murder, conduct like brib-
ery of a judge which would thwart other
regulation, prostitution, deviant sexual be-
havior, pornography, and blackmail and
certain other forms of "private law en-
forcement" made criminal. While Judge
Posner would qualify the conclusion that
such conduct is value-maximizing when se-
rious effects on third parties are taken ac-
count of, I see no reason to take account of
third-party interests in determining
whether the law should permit such con-
duct.
The logic of The Model, and hence the
logic of a legal system where The Model is
made the major premise, focuses only on
the bargain struck and enforces the rights
and rationalities the parties have expressed
in their agreement. To let the law interfere
on the pretext of preserving or protecting
some third party interest out of a wimpish
concern for other values would interject
uncertainty and unpredictability into the
analysis and upset the functioning of the
market. In the antitrust field, for example,
we would return to the era of Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775
(1984); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 85 S.Ct. 1856, 18
L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967), and Albrecht v. Her-
ald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 869, 19
L.Ed.2d 998 (1968), where the courts regu-
larly frustrated the will of rational maxi-
mizers by concerning themselves with the
"rights" of third-party intermediaries be-
tween the seller and the consumer.
4. Posner, n. 2, supra, at 1205.
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The meaning and application of
the First Amendment guarantee of a
free press take on new and more realis-
tic dimensions when one views its
function as protectionism for a special-
interest group which profits from pub-
lishing and broadcasting. 5 The senti-
mental view that attorneys should be
appointed to represent prisoners in
civil rights suits at public expense is
shown to be inefficient when one sees
that reliance on the contingent fee sys-
tem would rationally and efficiently
sort out the meritorious from the non-
meritorious prisoner suits.6 The un-
constitutionality of state anti-takeover
statutes designed to block profit maxi-
mizing multi-billion dollar merger
deals promoted by the rational maxi-
mizers of the investment banking in-
dustry becomes clear when one real-
izes that such laws interfere with
natural market processes by which in-
vestment bankers reorganize the effi-
cient use of capital assets.7 Even the
vexing question of when to issue a pre-
liminary injunction can be reduced to
a formula, quantifying those factors
which should be considered and seeing
whether the costs exceed or do not ex-
5. See "Influential Ideas, A Movement
Called 'Law and Economics' Sways Legal
Circles," Wall St. J., p. 1, col. 1 (August 4,
1986) (reporting Judge Posner's views on
the economic approach to the First
Amendment).
6. Ibid.
7. See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794
F.2d 250 (CA7 1986) (Posner, J.).
8. See American Hosp. Supply v. Hospital
Products, 780 F.2d 589 (CA7 1986) (Pos-
ner, J.). The formula is: P X Hp > (1 -
p) X Hd. The beauty of the formula is, of
course, that it guarantees certainty and
predictability by suppressing the unruly
horse of undue judicial discretion hiding
behind such vague generalities as "balance
of hardships" and the other poetry and
rhetoric traditionally displayed in prelimi-
nary injunction decisions. The formula
ceed the benefits of granting the in-
junction, when The Model is brought
to bear on the problem.8
I welcome the courage of the ma-
jority in restoring the appropriate role
of this Court in implementing the veri-
ties of the science of economics. This
Court should never have abandoned
its important role of protecting prop-
erty and contract rights from regula-
tion by government. For too long we
have been avoiding the inevitable dic-
tates of The Model by defaulting in
our responsibility to implement those
dictates, and leaving to Congress, state
governments, and juries the freedom
to do as they choose. By placing the
Sherman Act in its appropriate eco-
nomic perspective, we can at last end a
century of broad and far-ranging judi-
cial tampering with the free economy
and restore to its proper role the free-
dom and decision-making of corporate
America operating in perfectly com-
petitive markets.
Justice CLAYTON, with whom Jus-
tice ROBINSON and Justice PAT-
MAN join, dissenting.
also eliminates disputes over what the
"facts" are since only those quantifiable
facts the formula allows to be "facts" are
facts for purposes of the analysis.
A similar exercise has shown that prod-
ucts liability rules are not the result of nor-
mative concerns, but rather reflect the in-
exorable drive of the common law system
for efficient results- even though many of
the courts framing the rules may have been
completely oblivious of the insights of neo-
classical economics. See Landes & Posner,
A Positive Economic Analysis of Products
Liability, 14 J. Legal St. 535 (1985). This
is likewise true of the exclusionary rule for
violations of the Fourth Amendment. See,
Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Govern-
mental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57
Wash.L.Rev. 635 (1982).
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The majority opinion repeals the
Sherman Act almost one hundred
years to the day after it adoption, a
power one thought was reserved only
to Congress. The majority does so by
following the dictates of the neo-classi-
cal model (hereinafter, the model) of
economic theorizing, a supposedly
"non-activist" and "neutral" tool of
the "science" of economics much in
vogue with self-described political
"conservatives." 1 The model, in turn,
is premised upon assumptions of a
world which does not exist and in-
vokes hidden value choices to delegate
decision-making to private parties
backed by state intervention to enforce
the decisions made. Through a series
of deft and seemingly "logical" moves,
the model ends up with standards by
which one can find any conduct either
consistent with the assumptions of the
model, incapable of adversely affecting
consumers as measured by the conse-
quences of the model's analysis of its
Alice-in-Wonderland world, or not
happening in light of the assumptions
of the model and the tautological and
circular predictions which follow from
the assumptions underlying the model.
It is claimed that the model is a
value-free, neutral, and objective stan-
dard by which the judiciary may im-
plement the inevitable dictates of the
model. It does not require much im-
agination to see that the model ignores
the existing distribution of wealth,
time, the dynamic nature of reality,
and the existence of the legal system
and its enforcement of existing con-
tract and property rights.2 This is not
all the model ignores. As the majority
1. It should be noted that most professional
economists follow far more complex mod-
els than that advocated by the neo-classical
school. Some economists even engage in
empirical research in an effort to under-
stand how the economy and markets actu-
ally operate. They do not make the ridicu-
lous argument that one should not
compare the assumptions of the model
with reality, but only compare the predic-
tions of the model with reality. See ante, at
522-523, n.12. As this case demonstrates,
the model's assumptions determine what is
the reality which will be allowed to be the
only reality the model's predictions are
compared with. See Flynn, "Reaga-
nomics" and Antitrust Enforcement: A Ju-
risprudential Critique, 1983 Utah L.Rev.
269, 282; Mason, Some Negative Thoughts
On Friedman's Positive Economics, 3 J.
Post-Keynesian Econ. 235 (1980-81).
In some circles, for example Justice
CATO's, the advent of what is called law
and economics is considered a brilliant
stroke of insight. Economic theorizing of
many stripes has always informed the legal
process and rightly so. The difference be-
tween an appropriate informing of the pro-
cess and an inappropriate one is that the
so-called law and economics movement
substitutes the abstract theorizing of one
school of economic thought for legal anal-
ysis, rather than just informing the process
of legal analysis within the court's broader
obligations, institutional limitations, and
responsibilities for dealing with the messy
facts of the real world while functioning as
a court of law. The movement gains its
reputation for brilliance because it simpli-
fies (drastically and dangerously) the com-
plex and because its basic predictions are
counter-intuitive. The reason its basic pre-
dictions are often counter-intuitive is be-
cause they are derived from faulty and
often false assumptions of fact about the
real world. Decision-makers, therefore,
should approach such brilliant insights
with a good deal of skepticism and more
than a grain of salt. See Farber, The Case
Against Brilliance, 70 Minn.L.Rev. 917
(1987).
At a more fundamental level, it is appar-
ent that the entire model is premised on a
meaningless and tautological definition of
"rational"; a definition which does not re-
flect reality and which ignores the insights
of several disciplines which have made a
considerable study of human motivation
and behavior. See Harrison, Egoism, Al-
truism, and Market Illusions: The Limits
of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L.Rev.
1309 (1986).
2. It has been observed:
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opinion makes patently clear, exclu-
sive reliance on the model to deter-
mine the legality of conduct chal-
lenged under the antitrust laws causes
the Court to ignore both the facts of
the dispute and the purposes Congress
intended the antitrust laws to accom-
plish.3 Perhaps a psychiatrist or phi-
"[M]odern economists assume
that someone else, presumably the
lawyers, has already taken care of
the problem of "externalities"-
whether costs or benefits-by pro-
viding for their assignment or ap-
propriation by the state's enforce-
ment of particular private property
rules. Likewise, someone else has
already taken care of the problem of
excluding fraudulent transactions
and/or transactions under duress
from the universe of the perfect
competitors.
The choice to develop conservative
background rules was not one in
favor of efficient markets and
against egalitarian regulation; it was
one for a particularly inegalitarian
common law agenda and against a
more egalitarian one.
[Liaw plays the same apparently
minor and clear cut, but in reality
major and obscure role in neoclassi-
cal as in classical economics. As
before, it reinforces the status quo
through an ideological/apologetic
message. In classical economics,
the role of law was to make it plau-
sible that income shares were
equivalent to labor inputs, and that
unregulated exchange made all par-
ties better off than they could other-
wise be. In neoclassical economics
the notion of a determinate back-
ground legal regime of property and
contract makes it plausible that we
can and have to choose between effi-
cient market and egalitarian or eq-
uitable regulatory solutions. It
doesn't wash in either case.
Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic
Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Com-
modities, 34 Am.U.L.Rev. 939, 961, 966-
967 (1985).
3. The majority's assertion that "boobiness"
losopher may one day tell us why a
majority of this Court would allow it-
self to be seduced by the childlike sim-
plicity of a model of a world which
does not exist, spinning about in its
own closed world of tautological as-
sumptions and conclusions, 4 to deal
with the dynamic real'world issues
is avoided by keeping the number of vari-
ables limited to a fixed number of quantifi-
able ones viewed by "snapshot," ante, at
521, n. 9, is logical but not defensible. It
means that a good deal of the reality of the
dispute is being ignored or coerced into a
factor the model claims is quantifiable; fac-
tors defined and dictated by the ideology
underlying the model and by the need for
coherence of the model with its reliance
upon deductive logic. The reality of the
dispute, the policies of Congress in adopt-
ing the antitrust laws, and the logic of the
legal process are all sacrificed by the
mechanical methodology of the majority.
While the "boobiness" of a mistake in de-
ductive logic may be avoided, the "boobi-
ness" of a failure to use artfully the induc-
tive logic of legal analysis is not.
4. A few years ago, a chairperson of the
FTC gave a speech illustrating well the
simplistic and tautological nature of the
reasoning followed by the ideological pro-
ponents of an exclusive reliance upon the
neo-classical model to eviscerate antitrust
policy. Chairperson Daniel Oliver likened
interference with economic rights to inter-
ference with political rights. Chairperson
Oliver defined economic freedoms as "free-
dom to contract" and "freedom to hold
and dispose of property, without undue in-
terference from the state." Not surpris-
ingly, Mr. Oliver saw antitrust policy as a
form of governmental interference with
freedom to contract. See 51 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1283 at 428-
429 (Sept. 25, 1986).
The right to contract and the right to
own and dispose of property have long
been recognized as state-created rights.
See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
Cornell L.Q. 8 (1928); Pound, Liberty of
Contract, 18 Yale L.J. 454 (1909). If Mr.
Oliver were to be completely consistent, he
should oppose any state involvement with
the creation or enforcement of contract
and property rights, since it would amount
to state interference with what he believes
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Congress has mandated we resolve in
light of certain goals under the anti-
to be some kind of inherent natural right of
the individual. Instead he wants to have his
cake of state interference to create and en-
force contracts, and the right to eat it with-
out state interference.
Antitrust policy should be viewed as a
part of the state's definition of the scope of
state-created and protected contract and
property rights, not as a form of state inter-
ference with some kind of mystical and
preexisting rights standing in place free of
and independent of the existence of a legal
system. As such, the antitrust laws are the
expression of a societal consensus integral
to defining the scope of the rights the law
creates and enforces for social, political,
and economic goals of the society.
It should be apparent to even the most
ardent ideologue that the viability of "free-
dom to contract" is dependent ultimately
upon coercion; the expectancy that the
state will use its coercive power to enforce
the agreement made. The circumstances in
which the state will and will not bring its
coercive power to bear in enforcing the
bargain made defines, in turn, the scope of
the freedom which individuals and large
political entities like the modern corpora-
tion have to contract. The tautological na-
ture of the superficial reasoning followed
by government officials like Mr. Oliver ex-
plains in large part the decline in antitrust
enforcement by the government agencies
charged with that responsibility. It also
explains why much of what is passed off as
"economic analysis" today is largely irrele-
vant, sterile, and nonsensical. See Kutt-
ner, The Poverty of Economics, The Atlan-
tic Monthly, p. 74 (Feb. 1985).
5. Just as the "Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's So-
cial Statics," Lochner v. New York 198
U.S. 45, 75, 25 S.Ct. 539, 546, 49 L.Ed.
937, 949 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
the Sherman Act does not enact the neo-
classical economic model. The most objec-
tive study of the congressional goals sought
in adopting the Sherman Act found that
the leading economists of the day were op-
posed to the adoption of the Act on the
grounds that it constituted an interference
with the functioning of the market-the
classicist's concept of the market. Congress
adopted the statute with a different set of
objectives from those contemplated by
classical economics: "There are four major
trust laws. 5 Regretfully, I cannot pro-
ceed past the obvious conclusion that
historical goals of antitrust, and all should
continue to be respected. These are: (1)
dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom
and opportunity to compete on the merits,
(3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) pro-
tection of the competition process as mar-
ket governor." Fox, The Modernization of
Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell
L.Rev. 1140, 1182 (1982).
The significance of defining the underly-
ing congressional goals of antitrust policy
for the scope and meaning of the statute is
illustrated by Fishman v. Estate of Arthur
M. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (CA7 1986) (one of
the rare Seventh Circuit cases upholding a
lower court antitrust verdict for a plaintiff).
Compare, Illinois Corporate Travel v.
American Airlines, 806 F.2d 722 (CA7
1986) (Easterbrook, J., relying on the fic-
tion of a principal-agent relationship to
avoid applying the per se rule against verti-
cal price fixing). The majority in Fishman
emphasized the overall function of the an-
titrust laws as preserving and fostering a
"competitive process" in upholding a find-
ing of a violation of the Act in the context
of competition for a professional basketball
team franchise requiring access to a natu-
ral monopoly playing arena. Dissenting
Judge Easterbrook, labeling the goal of an-
titrust policy as "consumer welfare" and
its "cousin allocative efficiency" as defined
by the neo-classical model, would have
dismissed the antitrust claims absent some
specific proof of injury to consumers as the
result of one monopolist rather than an-
other taking over a natural monopoly mar-
ket. This result is the consequence of the
error of positing "consumer welfare" as the
sole goal of antitrust policy.
The Easterbrook approach also applied
the either-or fallacy, viz, that conduct is
either wholly anticompetitive (anti-"con-
sumer welfare") or wholly competitive
(pro-"consumer welfare"), with no ground
in between. The reality of complex and dy-
namic economic relationships does not
often fall into this either-or simpleminded
method of analysis, usually applied to
questionable pregnancies or whether it is
raining out or not. The only time one
might be justified in the either-or assump-
tion is in those non-existent circumstances
where the assumptions of the model exist
in reality. Where they do not, humility
ought to require a sophisticated and sensi-
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the majority opinion is patently wrong
and that the commentators on this
Court's opinions may well label that
opinion silly despite the traditional
constraint upon lawyers and academ-
ics of respect for the institution of the
judiciary. 6
My explanation for the startling
tive fact analysis rather than the mechani-
cal application of a simpleminded model of
a world which does not exist.
6. My brother-in-law, a philosopher, has re-
ported to me that the recent meeting of the
American Society of Philosophers was
highlighted by a speech ridiculing this
Court's analytical methodology. Survey-
ing a wide range of decisions, with a partic-
ular emphasis on the Matsushita case, the
main speaker at the meeting claimed that
the Court's majority has returned to the
use of a naive and simplistic analytical pos-
itivism. In philosophical circles, such a
mode of reasoning has long been discred-
ited. According to my brother-in-law, dis-
cussion of this Court's analytical skills pro-
voked much hilarity at the meeting as well
as comments like those suggested in my
opinion. I suspect that the majority and
concurring opinions in this case will gener-
ate a stunned disbelief at next year's meet-
ing of the Society and among other com-
mentators. Regretfully, the moral and
intellectual credibility of this Court-the
main sources of this Court's power as an
independent branch of government-may
well be undermined by what the majority
does here today.
7. The factual complexity of antitrust
claims has undoubtedly contributed to our
development of arcane "standing" require-
ments for private treble damage claimants.
See ante, at 531-532, n. 27. As the major-
ity opinion makes clear, our so-called
standing opinions may be used to bog
down and block treble damage claims even
where there has been a violation of the law
and even where there is no question that
the claimant has been injured by a viola-
tion. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo-
rado, 475 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 484 (1986),
this Court carried its confused standing
analysis so far as to repeal § 16 of the Clay-
ton Act as a practical matter and prevent
any private enforcement of § 7 of the Clay-
ton Act through injunctive actions. As the
majority opinion makes clear in this case,
majority opinion and the even more
startling concurring opinion is that
this Court has long been headed down
a path of excessive reliance on ideolog-
ically based and reified rules detached
from reality to decide controversies
arising in complex factual settings in
the antitrust field. 7 Antitrust policy
this Court's tortured standing doctrine in
the antitrust field may also be used as a ve-
hicle for implementing the otherwise un-
stated ideological views of a majority of
this Court without appearing to do so.
What this Court calls a "standing" re-
quirement in the antitrust field is usually
confused with what are called "causation"
or "proof of damage" issues elsewhere in
the law. We should abandon these con-
fused, bizarre, and unintelligible "stand-
ing" requirements described by the major-
ity, ante, at 531-532, n. 27, and return to
the standing test enunciated in Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas & Light Co.,
364 U.S. 656, 660, 81 S.Ct. 365, 367, 5
L.Ed.2d 358, 361 (1961): "[To state a
claim upon which relief can be granted
under . . . [the Sherman Act] allegations
adequate to show a violation and ... that
the plaintiff was injured thereby are all that
the law requires."
Issues which are now treated as standing
issues are usually questions concerning the
scope of the duties imposed by the antitrust
laws, the factual connection between the
violation of the duties imposed and injury
to the plaintiff, or the level of certainty in
proof of the amount of damages suffered by
the plaintiff. See Flynn, Rethinking Sher-
man Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Propos-
als for Reducing the Chaos, 49 Antitrust
L.J. 1593 (1980). Treating these kinds of
questions as standing issues results in liti-
gating causation and damage issues at pre-
liminary stages of the litigation by motion,
a judge deciding factual issues which
should be decided only after a trial and
only by a jury if the Seventh Amendment
means anything in the antitrust field, and
confusing what it is that violates the law
with who it is that may maintain a suit and
what kinds of evidence are necessary to
prove causation and the amount of dam-
age. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo-
rado, supra, for a good example of these
difficulties, as well as the use of standing
analysis to render useless a right Congress
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has been a natural target for ideologi-
cally based and seemingly objective
rules promising certainty and predict-
ability but divorced from any need to
account for all the factual circum-
stances in which antitrust controver-
sies appear or the underlying social,
political, and economic objectives
which Congress mandated the anti-
trust laws achieve. A part of the prob-
lem is caused by the broad generality
of the Sherman Act, a feature noted
early in judicial experience with the
statute, and one causing, at first, a lit-
eral interpretation greatly expanding
the meaning of the statute8 and, later,
the dilution of the scope and utility of
the statute through interpretations in-
jecting a meaningless rule of reason
test to serve as a mask hiding the im-
position of the personal political views
of the judge writing the opinion.9 As
has been the case with the interpreta-
tion of broad language in the Constitu-
tion such as the Due Process Clause
and "commercial" speech under the
First Amendment, the rule of reason
has become a vehicle for the imposi-
tion of a new form of substantive due
process by the judiciary.
In recent years antitrust policy
granted private parties to bring equitable
actions to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act.
As this case makes clear, this Court's an-
titrust standing decisions are being used
primarily to determine what it is that con-
stitutes a violation of the statute. Instead
of making a forthright declaration that the
majority does not agree with the policy
Congress has adopted, "standing" doctrine
is used to mask implementation of the
Court's hidden ideological agenda for dis-
mantling antitrust enforcement behind the
confused and confusing tests for "stand-
ing." The confusion is used to bar anti-
trust plaintiffs from pursuing the rights
Congress has clearly given them and to de-
feat the policies Congress has instructed
courts to implement without explicitly say-
ing so.
has been buffetted by claims that the
"science" of economics can bring cer-
tainty, predictability, and truth to the
legal analysis of disputes arising under
the antitrust laws. Paradoxically, the
reasoning process being advocated is
like that followed in United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,
87 S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967),
where this Court relied upon the an-
cient and venerable rule against re-
straints on alienation where title to
goods had passed to draw a bright line
between permissible and impermissible
vertical restraints. The logic used is
the rigid deductive logic of analytical
positivism. The perse rule of Schwinn,
like the rigid and fixed assumptions of
neo-classical speculation, is made the
major premise of a syllogism; only
those facts in the dispute comporting
with the assumptions underlying the
major premise are allowed to be the
minor premise in the reasoning of the
Schwinn and neo-classical approaches,
and the Court then draws its inevitable
conclusion. In both cases, the logic
followed displaces the complex induc-
tive and deductive logic required in
legal analysis, where the facts deter-
mine what rules are relevant, what
8. See Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 331, 24 S.Ct. 436,
454, 48 L.Ed. 679, 698 (1904) (holding the
Act is "not limited to restraints.., that are
unreasonable in their nature, but embraces
all direct restraints imposed by any combi-
nation .. ").
9. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 228 U.S. 344, 53 S.Ct. 471,
77 L.Ed. 825 (1938); Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38 S.Ct. 242,
62 L.Ed. 683 (1918). Cf., United States v.
Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct.
1107, 92 L.Ed. 1533 (1948); International
Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 50 S.Ct. 89, 74
L.Ed. 431 (1930); United States v. United
States Steel, 251 U.S. 417, 40 S.Ct. 293, 64
L.Ed. 343 (1920).
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they mean, and how they should ap-
ply, while the rules determine what
facts are relevant, what they mean,
and how they affect the result. Induc-
tive logic plays a significant role in de-
termining which rules are relevant and
in pouring meaning into the rules. In-
ductive logic also plays a significant
role in defining which facts are rele-
vant to the major premise and what
weight they have in the minor premise.
This unbreakable analytical circle of
legal reasoning is the common law
method which has developed over the
centuries as the best and most worka-
ble method for many of our tasks: for
accommodating the reality of disputes
committed to courts to the generality
of laws adopted by the community; for
implementing the policies behind the
laws found relevant in light of the real-
ities of the dispute; for recognizing the
institutional constraints upon those
charged with making the decision in
the context of the dispute and the
power of other institutions to deter-
mine the facts and the policies to be
implemented; and, for importing the
requirements for balancing common
sense and principle and balancing cer-
tainty and flexibility in order to pro-
vide a basis in precedent for dealing
with unforeseen future evolutions in
reality.
In the Schwinn and neo-classical
approaches the policies underlying the
rule put forward as the sole path to
truth, beauty, and wisdom contain val-
ues and insights worth considering in
the analysis. In each case, however,
exclusive reliance upon the deductive
method of analysis followed and the
underlying assumptions of the policy
advocated produces an analytical meat
10. The implication of this assertion is, of
course, that reliance upon notions of fair-
cleaver incapable of wisely analyzing
the reality of the dispute in light of the
objectives Congress mandated we ac-
count for in enforcing the antitrust
laws. In each case the rigid deductive
reasoning process causes the Court to
ignore facts of the dispute not in con-
formity with the fixed assumptions of
the major premise. And, in each case,
the reasoning process distorts the ap-
propriate balance between the courts
and Congress and the judge and jury
in the decision-making process.
Today's decision indicates how
far the tunnel vision induced by an ex-
clusive reliance upon the neo-classical
economic model can drive a court to
ignore reality, the goals of antitrust
policy, the institutional limitations
upon courts vis-a-vis those on Con-
gress, and the function of the constitu-
tional right to jury trials. This Court
began its trip down the trail to its pres-
ent state of unintended intellectual
blindness and institutional arrogance
in Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97 S.Ct. 2549,
53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977). In that case,
the Court found itself confronted with
the unrealistic and wooden per se rule
of Schwinn in a case challenging the
vertical imposition of customer and
territorial restrictions by a small tele-
vision manufacturer seeking to shelter
its dealer distribution system from in-
trabrand competition in order to suc-
ceed in interbrand competition with
other manufacturers. Instead of mod-
erating the rigid reasoning process of
the Schwinn decision, the Sylvania de-
cision asserted that "an antitrust
policy divorced from market consider-
ations would lack any objective
benchmarks." Id., at 53 n. 21.10 The
ness, the independence of business, the bal-
ance between inter- and intrabrand com-
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opinion then turned to economic anal-
ysis to provide the "objective
benchmarks" and held that vertically
imposed customer and territorial
agreements should not be found per se
illegal.
The rejection of a rigid and
mechanical per se rule in Sylvania was
petitive effects, and the other goals
Congress mandated we account for in anti-
trust enforcement are not reliable
benchmarks for deciding cases. Courts
and juries are always relying on "non-mar-
ket" benchmarks for deciding issues like
those arising in torts, contracts, and First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
litigation. The further implication of the
Court's remark is that "market considera-
tions" (read "economic analysis") provide
"objective benchmarks." It is readily ap-
parent that this assertion is not only unsup-
ported, but is insupportable. Economic
analysis is not a value-free and objective
science producing "objective benchmarks."
It is a subjective field of human knowledge
based upon ideological assumptions con-
cerning wealth distribution, the oughts of
government-private relationships, and the
meaning and purpose of fields of law like
contract and property. Neo-classical eco-
nomic analysis, only one of many schools
of economic thought, is widely recognized
as a political ideology bordering on a reli-
gion and blinding its followers to a realistic
evaluation of reality and an open-minded
evaluation of the moral assumptions rele-
vant to the dispute. See Flynn, The Mis-
use of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Liti-
gation, 12 Sw.U.L.Rev. 335 and Appendix,
12 Sw.U.L.Rev. 361 (1981); Flynn, "Rea-
ganomics" and Antitrust Enforcement: A
Jurisprudential Critique, 1983 Utah L.Rev.
269; Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and
the Delusion of Models: The Faustian Pact
of Law and Economics, 72 Geo.L.J. 1511
(1984).
Some are blinded and misled by the way
in which proponents of the model borrow
words with a broad and general meaning
that few would disagree with and then use
them in a special, technical, and severely
limited way when it comes to applying the
model. Words like "efficiency" and "con-
sumer welfare" have a praiseworthy con-
notation in popular speech which is often
misunderstood as their connotation when
not accompanied by the suggestion of
a flexible, yet knowable and predict-
able, methodology for analyzing when
such restraints ought to be found con-
sistent with the congressional purposes
for enforcing the antitrust laws and
when they should be found inconsis-
tent.' In its next major decision on
used in the model. The relation of the pop-
ular meaning of "efficiency" to its technical
meaning under the severe assumptions and
constraints of the model is about the same
as the relationship of the concept "peace-
keeper" to an intercontinental nuclear mis-
sile. The technical concept of "consumer
welfare" has about as much relation to as-
sured benefits for the average person in the
real world as the Chicago Cubs do to a Na-
tional League Pennant-pure chance.
11. The opinion does not suggest how the
legality of such conduct should be mea-
sured under the rule of reason. For a sug-
gested method of analysis, see Flynn, The
Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules
In Vertical Market Restraints, 58
Wash.U.L.Q. 767 (1983); Flynn, The "Is"
and "Ought" of Vertical Market Restraints
After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 71 Cornell L. Rev. 1095 (1986).
The suggestion is that the courts establish
as the goals of antitrust policy the ones
which Professor Fox's scholarship estab-
lishes were the goals Congress had in
mind, see n. 5, supra, and the courts en-
forced until they became enamored of the
neo-classical model. Under this method of
analysis, the per se rules are treated as evi-
dentiary presumptions of illegality of vary-
ing levels of rebuttability. The level of
rebuttability would be determined by the
degree to which the conduct actually tak-
ing place in the factual circumstances of
the case impinged on the goals Congress
mandated that courts implement through
antitrust decisions. This is, of course, a
qualitative and not a quantitative analysis.
The same methodology would be followed
in rule of reason cases, but no presumption
of illegality would be entertained because
the conduct in question does not suggest
on its face an impingement on the goals of
antitrust policy. It is the method of analy-
sis this Court has followed implicitly in a
long line of cases. See FTC v. Indiana Fed-
eration of Dentists. 106 S.Ct. 2009 (1986);
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the issue, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct.
1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), this
Court did little to clarify the question.
In upholding a jury verdict finding the
defendant had engaged in a vertical
price-fixing conspiracy, this Court was
not asked to overrule the per se rule
against vertical price fixing. Instead,
the case focused on the sufficiency of
the evidence to prove a conspiracy had
taken place for purposes of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. In the course of its
opinion, however, this Court once
again referred to "economic theory"
as a legitimate basis for deciding anti-
trust cases in its drawing of a distinc-
tion between the treatment of price
and non-price vertical restraints. The
Court held that conduct which is as
consistent with permissible competi-
tion as with illegal conspiracy does
not, standing alone, support an infer-
ence of antitrust conspiracy. Id., at
764, 104 S.Ct., at 1470.
That holding, one made with re-
gard to the legal question of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to prove unlaw-
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma, 463 U.S. 1311, 104 S.Ct. 1,
82 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1984); Broadcast Music
v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 1551, 60
L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 55 L.Ed.2d 637
(1978).
The question in both per se and rule of
reason cases is whether there has been an
unreasonable displacement of the competi-
tive process (as defined by the congres-
sional goals for antitrust), not whether
there has been an elimination of "competi-
tion" in the sense that the term is defined
by the neo-classical model. Requiring
proof of an injury to competition generally
results in the requirement of proof of a rel-
evant market and power in the market de-
fined, thereby ignoring the congressional
purposes in adopting the statute and oblit-
erating the distinction between §§ I and 2
ful conspiracy, was picked up in
Matsushita and made the basis for as-
suming that the neo-classical model of
economic theorizing must be relied
upon in motions for summary judg-
ment to determine the fact question of
whether there is a conspiracy and the
policy question of whether it is one
which ought to be declared illegal.
106 S.Ct., at 1357. Matsushita made
the assumptions of the abstract model
the vehicle for determining what the
"facts" of a dispute could be, and
made the predictions of the model the
range of permissible policy goals the
antitrust laws could aspire to achieve.
It also made the rigid and deductive
reasoning process followed by users of
the model the reasoning process which
must be followed in legal decision-
making in the antitrust field and the
process for determining what "facts"
would be the facts for purposes of the
analysis. Instead of using logic to in-
vestigate the assumptions underlying
the premises of the rules for decision
in light of the facts and vice-versa
(legal reasoning), "logic" is being used
to hide a process of abstaining from re-
of the Sherman Act. The majority's dis-
cussion of the Rothery decision, ante, at
523, n. 13, demonstrates how such an ana-
lytical process can wipe out both the legis-
lative purpose behind the statute and the
verbal and historical distinction between
§§ 1 and 2 of the Act. The significance of
Rothery is not the result in that case, a re-
sult I concur with, but the way in which
the Court got there by importing § 2 struc-
tural considerations into the analysis of be-
havior in a § 1 case. The inquiry is a quali-
tative one into the effect of the behavior on
the congressionally mandated goals of anti-
trust policy, not a quantitative inquiry into
the impact of the restraint upon "'competi-
tion" as defined by some abstract model.
That is what footnote 59 of United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.. 310 U.S. 150, 224
n. 59, 60 S.Ct. 811, 845 n. 59, 84 L.Ed.
1129, 1168-1169 i. 59 (1940), is all about.
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examining the assumptions underlying
the premises relied upon and all the
facts of the dispute (analytical
positivism).
The consequences of such a rea-
soning process are easy to see. The de-
fendants in Matsushita were permitted
to carry the burden of supporting their
summary judgment motion by relying
upon the factual and policy assump-
tions of the model, while the plaintiff
was required to carry its burden of re-
butting the motion by making factual
showings indicating the predictions of
the model did not follow from the un-
challengeable assumptions of the
model. Rebutting a phantom made
logically irrebuttable is not an easy
thing to do and it should not be sur-
prising that a court which reasons the
way the majority did in Matsushita
would be unwilling to even investigate
the record or to accord any weight
whatsoever to evidence suggesting the
model's assumptions did not equate
with reality. The net result is that any
conduct alleged as violating the anti-
trust laws can never be found to do so,
because the court hearing the defend-
ant's inevitable motion for summary
judgment will be off in a world which
does not exist analyzing the internal
logic of an abstract and irrelevant
model instead of inductively analyzing
the concrete reality before it in light of
the policies Congress intended be im-
plemented through the antitrust laws.
The logic of Matsushita dictates to-
day's decision.
There is a broader consequence of
Matsushita evident in today's decision.
Following the reasoning process of
12. The majority needs to read some basic
writings about the nature of legal reason-
ing. I would commend to them for start-
Matsushita, with its incorporation of
the deductive logic used by the model
in lieu of legal reasoning, 12 enables the
Court to administer the final coup de
grdce to the antitrust laws. Exclusive
reliance upon the model and its rea-
soning process not only determines
what antitrust policy will be allowed
to be, contrary to the intent of Con-
gress, but is also used to determine
what will be allowed to be the facts a
court will consider in an antitrust case,
without regard to the reality of the dis-
pute before the court. From such a
closed-minded and incredible misuse
of the legal process, I can only enter
the most vehement dissent and a
lonely prayer that new appointments
to this Court may restore some mea-
sure of common sense to our delibera-
tions and some basic skill with legal
reasoning to the writing of our
opinions.
Justice ROBINSON, dissenting.
I concur in all that Justice
CLAYTON has said and join in his
lonely prayer with the slight amend-
ment that any new judicial appointees
not be cursed with a fetish for foot-
notes. Instead of judicial opinions, we
appear to be writing law review arti-
cles with many things being hidden in
footnotes for later use as precedent.
See Mikva, Goodbye To Footnotes, 56
U.Colo.L.Rev. 647 (1985). I fear our
prayer is not likely to be answered,
however, until such time as the United
States Senate begins to exercise
responsibly and sensibly its advise and
consent function in the appointment
process for members of the Judiciary.
ers, despite the University of Chicago con-
nection, E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning (1962).
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